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UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE WAR ON TERROR
by Rachael Lorna Johnstone*
ABSTRACT
The contemporary threat of international terrorism has prompted states and scholars to reassess
the public/private divide as it manifests in international law with particular regard to the
principles of state responsibility. Much of the counter-terrorism debate reflects the feminist
literature on international law published over the last two decades. This paper exposes striking
similarities between the counter-terrorism arguments and those of feminist scholars. In both
cases, the classical dichotomy between public and private spheres is challenged and states are
called to be accountable for the unlawful conduct of non-state actors. Nonetheless, the
public/private dichotomy remains at the heart of counter-terrorism strategies as well as the
broader regimes of international law. Examples discussed in the conclusion include the nonrecognition of “enemy combatants” as state organs or agents; privatization of military and nonmilitary operations during the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq; the privatization of gender
discrimination in state (re-)building; and reinforcement of gender stereotypes and women’s
private roles in the “War on Terror.” While the proponents of counter-terrorism leverage
arguments against the public-private dichotomy in their favor, the similarities between the two
positions end where the anti-terrorist position ultimately returns to the dichotomy and reinforces
it in order to uphold state interests, effectively turning its back on women’s rights.
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UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE WAR ON TERROR
INTRODUCTION

The contemporary threat of international terrorism has prompted states and scholars to
reassess the public/private divide as it manifests in international law with particular regard to the
principles of state responsibility. Without acknowledging the intellectual debt, much of the
debate mirrors the concerns expressed by feminist theorists of international law in the 1990s.
This paper explores similarities between some of the feminist literature and the counter-terrorism
arguments in international law. The argument concludes that despite overlapping values in these
two bodies of discourse there is no cause for optimism among feminists; the challenge to the
public/private divide from the terrorism threat is unlikely to provide any relief to the most
vulnerable of the world’s women and, to the contrary, the public/private divide remains essential
to both counter-terrorism strategies and the wider agendas of Western governments within the
international system.
Part One briefly introduces the public/private divide and its place in international law. In
Part Two, the feminist critiques of the public/private divide, from the 1990s to the present day,
will be explored. Part Three examines post 9/11 challenges to the public/private divide in
counter-terrorism literature and practice. Part Four provides examples illustrating that the
public/private divide remains alive and well and is essential to the “War on Terror” at the
expense of many of the world’s women.
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PART 1: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE

The Public/Private Divide in International Law

Neither the dichotomy between public and private nor feminist concerns with the same
require introduction to scholars of international law or feminist legal theory. The separation
between public and private spheres lies at the heart of the liberal theory of the state and has been
adopted into classical international law theory, no more so than in the International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Articles).1 Within the domestic realm, the
public sphere is associated with political participation, macroeconomics and criminal justice. 2
The private sphere, by contrast, contains paradigmatically the family, as well as microeconomics,
market trade, “private law” and employment.3
In practice, when trying to allocate aspects of daily life to public or private spheres, the
dichotomy quickly collapses. Education of children would historically be considered a private
matter, something either inside the family or contracted out to a private school system. 4 In
modern liberal democracies, education is provided directly by the state and even where private or
home-schooling are options, education remains rigorously monitored.5 Private law may apply in

1

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
2
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 62-63, 89-90 (David Spitz, ed., W.W. Norton & Co., New York: 1975) (1859).
3
Id. at 88 (on micro-economics and market trade), 91-92 (on employment), 94-96 (private law), 97-100 (the family),
and 103-04 (micro-economics and market trade).
4
Id. at 97-100.
5
E.g., In England and Wales, it is a criminal offense to operate a school without registering with the state and all
schools are subject to regular inspections: Education Act, c. 32 (Eng. & Wal.) §§ 157-171 (2002) (especially, § 159).
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relationships between private individuals, but it can only exist at all because the state creates the
rules and staffs the courts in which those rules are adjudicated.
The assignment of life’s experiences to public or private sectors entails an element of
choice, but a sphere is public to the extent that the governing authorities of the state are active in
its regulation or provision. A sphere remains private if the state remains uninvolved. Malcolm
Evans explains: “the private sphere is only the private sphere because the State has not yet
intruded into it.”6 For this reason, certain aspects of life, such as healthcare, that are considered
public in one state may be considered private in another. Such differences arise even between
states that are ostensibly similar in political, economic and social bases.7
Despite its fluidity, the separation of the public and private has proven conceptually
powerful and has become entrenched in the systems of international law. 8 This entrenchment
manifests itself at two levels. First, the state that is recognized in international law is largely
composed of the institutions that the state recognizes as public under its internal order.9 The actor
in international law, the creator of international legal norms and subject of state responsibility is

Parents opting to teach their children at home must also make formal agreements with their local education authority
and meet various requirements: School Standards and Framework Act, c. 31 (Eng. & Wal.) §§ 110-111 (1998).
6
Malcolm D. Evans, State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and Realm, in
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 139, 159 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice
& Dan Sarooshi, eds., 2004); see also Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private
Dichotomy? 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 93, 96 (1993) (noting that a decision not to regulate is equally a political decision).
7
E.g., Healthcare is publicly funded and operated in the United Kingdom and Canada, with a small private sector. In
the United States, a similar common-law, English-speaking developed market economy, healthcare is
overwhelmingly a matter of private insurance and private provision with the state taking a minimal supplementary
interest in the most needy.
8
Doris Buss, Austerlitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 87, 94 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji, eds., 2005).
9
ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 4. It is theoretically possible to have organs or agents that are not defined by the
internal order under the second paragraph of the article, but as explained by the commentaries to the article and
confirmed in the Genocide Convention case, it is rare in practice; see, Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.),
reprinted in 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide Convention case].
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the state, self-defined. The distinction between state and non-state actors is fundamental to
international law; “private actions are not in principle attributable to the state.”10
Second, international law traditionally has permitted the public/private divide to be
reflected in a separation between international and domestic spheres. Wholly internal (private)
affairs are matters of domestic jurisdiction and hence of no interest to international law.11 Just as
the pater familias closes the door on his private family, shielding it from public scrutiny, so the
state closes its gates to international scrutiny of its domestic affairs. 12 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks
describes this idea: “Until quite recently, international law viewed the state as a black box into
which international law could not see – and did not wish to see.”13
The post-war development of international human rights law has brought challenges to
this Westphalian model, bringing domestic affairs into the spotlight of international law. 14
However, even within human rights law, the state reigns supreme. The state is the creator of
international human rights law; it must consent to uphold human rights norms by virtue of treaty
or acceptance of customary law. 15 Furthermore, the distinction between public and private
remains entrenched in human rights law to the extent that only states can be held accountable for
violations, and state and non-state breaches of human rights law are treated quite differently
within the discipline. 16

10

ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 153 (1994). Higgins
goes on to note exceptions which will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 16-27.
11
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminist Justice, at Home and Abroad: Feminism and International Law: An
Opportunity for Transformation, 14 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 345, 348 (2002).
12
Shelley Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the State: A Feminist Reappraisal, in RECONCEIVING
REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 128-9 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, ed., 1993).
13
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 11.
14
Id. at 348-49.
15
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd. Ed., 153-155 (2005).
16
States may be held accountable for private violations of human rights, but only on the basis of their failure to
exercise due diligence to protect; the violation is therefore a separate delict (lack of due diligence) and not
responsibility for the private violation per se.
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State Responsibility in the ILC Articles

The distinction between public and private is reified in the ILC Articles, the second
reading of which was finalized in 2001.17 Responsibility of states depends upon the identification
of a state actor; responsibility for non-state violations of international law is regarded as quite
exceptional. Articles 4, 5 and 8 identify actors for whom state responsibility is engaged.18 Article
4 refers to state organs, de iure or de facto, and article 8 refers to agents-actors who would
normally be considered private but for the fact that they are acting under the direct control or
following explicit instructions of a state organ identified in article 4.19 Article 5 allows state
responsibility for private actors who are authorized to undertake “governmental” functions on
behalf of the state.20 The articles read:
Article 4
Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its
character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the
internal law of the State.21

17

ILC Articles, supra note 1.
Id., arts. 4, 5 & 8.
19
Id., arts. 4 & 8.
20
Id., art. 5.
21
Id., art. 4.
18
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Article 5
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements
of governmental authority
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but
which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the
person or entity is acting in that capacity in that particular instance. 22
Article 8
Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction and control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.23

Although, under article 4(2) the internal law’s categorization of an entity as “public” or
“private” is not definitive, the identification of a state organ de facto is highly exceptional and
requires a relationship of “complete dependence” or the absence of “any real autonomy.”24
Article 5 requires that the state specifically confer upon the entity the “state” (governmental)
function and the actions of the para-statal entity are attributable only to the extent that they are
indeed taken in the exercise of the governmental function.25 The definition of “governmental” is
inconclusive and ILC recognizes in the commentaries that this is a contextual standard. It is, as
the ILC concludes, “a narrow category.”26 Under article 8, for the state to take responsibility for
the conduct of private actors that it “directs or controls” requires a very high degree of control,
22

Id., art. 5.
Id., art. 8.
24
Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26), at paras. 393-94; see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua].
25
ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 5.
26
ILC Articles, supra note 1, commentary to art. 5, paras 6 & 7.
23
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namely “effective control,” which can rarely be established absent explicit instructions, followed
precisely, or direct, specific control over each wrongful act.27

PART 2: FEMINIST CRITIQUES

Distinguishing Wife-Beaters and Those Who Harbor Them

The leading, early feminist assault on the public/private divide in international law is
found in Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s seminal 1991 article, Feminist Approaches to
International Law. 28 The arguments in this article triggered a wealth of scholarship in which
feminists remain actively engaged to the present day. 29 Within this body of academia, an ongoing
tension arises between the desire to deconstruct the public/private divide altogether by
demonstrating its vacuousness and a more pragmatic agenda that entails strategically and perhaps
even skeptically accepting the divide, but demanding the inclusion of women’s concerns in
public spaces.30
Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s famous article brought a feminist light to a number
of areas of international law including colonialism and decolonization; the exclusion of women
de facto in international organizations and as the creators of international law; the patriarchal
27

Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26), at para. 400. For a more detailed analysis,
see Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A Concerto for Court, Council & Committee, 37(1) DENVER J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 63 at 64-75 (2008).
28
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INT’L L. 613 (1991).
29
See, e.g. INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES, supra note 8; RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12; WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD
(Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994); Brooks, supra note 11; Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of
International Law, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275 (2002).
30
See, Buss, supra note 8, especially at 96-99; Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction:
Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at
143-144.
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premises behind the concept of the state; the state-centric basis of international law; and the
presumed irrelevance of women’s lives and experiences. 31 They pointed to the marginalization of
women’s rights and weaker enforcement mechanisms for the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women compared to other human rights treaties and the
tolerance of far-reaching reservations to the former Convention. 32 They criticized the focus on
rights, in particular civil and political rights, sometimes enjoyed at the expense of women, and on
criteria of self-determination that ignore the participation or lack of participation by women in
the identification of the “self” to be determined. 33 As interesting as these arguments are, this
article will focus primarily on the feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy, as this
critique is mirrored by counter-terrorism discourses. In counter-terrorism strategies, nonetheless,
as this article will show, while the public/private dichotomy breaks down on the one hand with
regard to state responsibility, it is simultaneously upheld on the other, with significant and costly
repercussions for women.34
Charlesworth et al., recognized that the precise boundaries of what constitutes public and
private vary between different cultures.35 Nonetheless, a common feature was that whenever
there was a private sphere, women were found there. 36 However, in areas considered public,
women were missing, invisible, or few in number.37 This division of public and private spheres,
emerging from the Western Liberal tradition, was now entrenched in international law. 38 Not

31

Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 621-22.
Id. at 631-33; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
33
Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, 621-22, 625 & 634-38; see also, Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar?
Feminist Analysis of International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
12, at 126.
34
Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 625-30.
35
Id. at 626.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 627.
32
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only are the spheres separate, but the private sphere and the women within it are regarded as less
important.39 Moreover, “a universal pattern of identifying women's activities as private, and thus
of lesser value, can be detected.”40 The classical principles of state responsibility assume that
only acts of state give rise to human rights violations. Harms that occur in private might be
unwelcome, but they are not matters of human rights or a fortiori international law.41
Charlesworth later expands on the public/private dichotomy in human rights law, arguing
that it is implicit in the separation of “generations” of rights and the preference for civil and
political rights (liberal rights) to economic, social, cultural, and group rights. 42 Wright illustrates
the extent to which the public and private spheres exist in a symbiotic relationship where one
cannot exist without the other and each defines the other.43
Chinkin’s review of the drafting of the ILC articles is critical of the unquestioning
assumption of a genuine distinction between public and private conduct.44 Attribution of activity
to the state depends on the character of the actor, not the character of the action. Although there
is scope for exception, the identification of an actor as an organ of state is almost exclusively
defined by the state’s internal law. 45 Chinkin expresses disappointment that expansion of the
notion of due diligence, particularly in human rights law, has not been taken into account in the
ILC Articles, recognizing that “non-regulation of the market is itself an expression of political
preference.”46 She suggests parallel policy choices in domestic and family issues.47

39

Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 626.
41
Id. at 627.
42
Hilary Charlesworth, What are “Women’s International Human Rights?” in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 58, 71-76; see also Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes
Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 85.
43 Wright, supra note 12, at 120-23. See also, Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/ Private Dimension, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 389 (1999).
44
Chinkin, supra note 43, at 387-89.
45
Id. at 388; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
46
Chinkin, supra note 43, at 392.
40
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Competing Strategies

The tensions amongst feminist scholars, even within the programs of each individual
feminist scholar, become apparent when they attempt to work with the critique in order to make
international law more relevant to women’s lives.48 The most significant of these, alluded to
above, is about whether or not to work within the existing scheme for incremental improvements.
In other words, the feminist critique questions whether it is better to accept the public/private
dichotomy at face value but demand that women’s concerns be included in the public; or whether
to decry the dichotomy altogether and dismantle the architecture of liberal theory and
international law. 49
Rebecca Cook takes a pragmatic approach in her work on women’s human rights.50
Rather than seeking a radical overhaul of the entire international human rights system—because
that may risk significant short-term losses in human rights protection for women and men
alike—she speaks in a language that international law can hear. 51 She argues that the principles
of state responsibility be understood with a greater reflection on women’s experiences, in
particular, by expanding state responsibility for omissions. 52

47

Id. at 395.
Christine Chinkin, Gender Inequality and International Human Rights Law, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION,
AND WORLD POLITICS 95, 121 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, eds., 1999); HILARY CHARLESWORTH &
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 59-61 (2000).
49
Doris Buss introduces the concept of “architecture” to explain the conceptual separation of public and private
spaces in international law: Buss, supra note 8.
50
Rebecca Cook, State Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 228
[hereinafter Cook, State Accountability); Rebecca Cook, Accountability in International Law for Violations of
Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
12 at 93 [hereinafter Cook, Accountability in International Law].
51
Cook, State Accountability, supra note 50, especially at 237.
52
Id.; see also Cook, Accountability in International Law, supra note 50. See also, Kenneth Roth, Domestic
Violence as an International Human Rights Issue, in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY
48
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Cook cites the Janes Arbitration case as evidence of the distinction “in principle and in
practice” between state responsibility for acts and omissions.53 The case states that “[e]ven if
non-punishment of a murderer really amounted to complicity in the murder, still it is not
permissible to treat this… as just as serious as if the Government had perpetrated the killing with
its own hands.”54
Charlesworth and Chinkin contest this assumption at the heart of international law.
Charlesworth argues: “if violence against women is understood, not just as aberrant behavior, but
as part of the structure of the universal subordination of women, it can never be considered a
purely “private” issue.”55 Chinkin adds: “Why should the state only be responsible for the
internationally wrongful acts of state organs? The state claims jurisdiction over the totality of
functions within its territorial control; it might therefore be appropriate to assert its responsibility
for all wrongful acts emanating from it, or from nationals subject to its jurisdiction.”56 Together,
they argue: “There is no reason why the maintenance of a legal and social system in which
violence against women is endemic and accepted should not engage state responsibility directly,
whether or not women are treated differently from men in this respect.”57
Domestic violence is defined according to the liberal tradition by its occurrence in the
private sphere because it is “domestic” as opposed to public. 58 It does not matter whether it
occurs literally behind closed doors, in a dark alleyway or in a crowded public bar. The fact that

FORWARD, supra note 42, at 326, (arguing that direct state responsibility for private violations of human rights risks
destabilizing the whole system of human rights protection and undoing the moral, social and political gains in the
field because a number of groups could claim to be systematically oppressed and he fears dilution of the power of
human rights language).
53
Cook, Accountability in International Law, supra note 50, at 98.
54
Janes v United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1951). See also TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE:
RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 17-23 (2006).
55
Charlesworth, supra note 42, at 73.
56
Chinkin, supra note 43, at 395.
57
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 149.
58
Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 628-29.
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it occurs between two people who are intimately acquainted renders the behavior domestic and
thus private.59 By contrast, it is not considered “domestic violence,” or even a private matter,
when two work colleagues engage in a similar interaction, regardless of the length of time they
have worked together and the apparent depth of their personal relationship with one another. 60 It
is not the location of the abuse that defines abuse as public or private rather it is the way that the
relationship between the perpetrator and victim are perceived. If it is not a familial relationship,
it is not private.61

Responses and Ongoing Challenges

Feminist Approaches to International Law triggered a number of responses, including
those among feminists sympathetic to the broader purpose of women’s inclusion in international
law.62 These responses led to the more enriched and subtle critique that is prevalent today. There
were two principal feminist replies to the public/private dichotomy as outlined in the 1991 article
and both of these were swiftly taken into account in the authors’ later work.63 The first was a
response of feminists from developing and non-Western countries to a perceived “essentialism”
in the early work; women everywhere might be subject to patriarchy, but its manifestations were

59

Id. at 627.
Id.
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses in
THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 51 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty, et al., eds., 1991); Radhika
Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights, in WOMEN’S
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 39; Diane Otto, Rethinking the
“Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997/98); Engle, supra note 30; Lacey,
supra note 6; Buss, supra note 8.
63
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48; Charlesworth, supra note 42; Chinkin, supra note 43; Chinkin, supra
note 48; Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, 19 ADELAIDE L. REV. 13, 20 (1997);
Wright, supra note 12.
60
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not everywhere the same.64 In some cases, first-world women are, if not complicit, at least the
beneficiaries of a patriarchal and exploitative relationship between their countries and
developing countries, which contributes to human and gender inequality. Further “women in
developing countries” are not a homogenous group with shared concerns and interests. It is
unhelpful for Western feminists to make sweeping assumptions about what is in their interests.
Fundamentally, the rights strategy that fits well in Western liberal democracies as a language that
institutions can understand may not fit well in other societies. 65 The second challenge came from
feminists concerned that scholars were by their work reifying the public/private dichotomy.66
Moreover, by associating all things “female” with the private, they were trapping women within
it.67 They were accused of falling into the easy habit of assuming that all women’s interests were
by definition in the private sphere.68 A related argument is that in some cases, the private sphere
provides a refuge, a place of protection and freedom, for women. 69
In their 2000 text, The Boundaries of International Law, Charlesworth and Chinkin
demonstrate a more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of women’s experiences.70 They
recognize that the allocation of human activity to public or private is not universal, but varies
between societies. 71 Further, they accept Coomaraswamy’s reflections that the state should not
always be considered as a “Scandinavian” protector of its citizens.72 They acknowledge the
potential of the private sphere as a site of liberation and freedom for women. 73 However, the

64

Mohanty, supra note 62, Coomaraswamy, supra note 62, Otto, supra note 62.
Mohanty, supra note 62, Coomaraswamy, supra note 62, Otto, supra note 62.
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basic argument is the same; the public/private dichotomy is still thriving in international legal
theory. Despite advances in human rights law with respect to states’ positive duties to protect,
violations of the rights of women are still not taken as seriously as those of men.74 Moreover, the
preference for civil and political rights reflects men’s experiences of the need for protection
against the state. Charlesworth and Chinkin consider the right to life, largely understood as
requiring protection against state threats, but not against the risk of being conceived female. 75
Despite some frustration with the lack of changes and the maintenance of the architecture
of international law with its stubborn even if illusory boundaries, the pragmatic approach of
working within that architecture has shown some successes. The notion of positive duties has
made considerable advancement within human rights law, and the human rights treaty bodies
have taken on a more gender balanced perspective. 76 Chinkin’s 1997 concern that there was
“greater resistance” to the expansion of state liability for lack of due diligence to prevent private
abuses against women has perhaps by now been overcome, at least in the human rights treaty
bodies.77
Although there remains a need to question artificial constructs that entrench inequality,
the individual gains achieved by working within the system should also be celebrated. These
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short-term victories are crucial for the women whose lives are affected and whose lives may
even be saved. 78

PART THREE: THE “WAR ON TERROR”

International Terrorism

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and perhaps even more
significantly, the perceived need for a military response, have complicated traditional
assumptions about state responsibility for the actions of non-state terrorists in ways reminiscent
of the feminist discourse examined in Part Two above. Similar to the feminist scholarship, one
can see two main shifts of perspective in the area. One works within the classical framework
with a greater focus on the positive obligations of states to prevent terrorism and a higher degree
of due diligence.79 The other questions the entire basis of the public/private dichotomy, insists
that terrorists cannot be distinguished from the states in which they are permitted to operate, and
that state responsibility for terrorist activities should be direct.80 These positions are not always
clearly demarcated.
Despite thirteen treaties with global reach, a number of regional treaties, United Nations
Security Council (the Council) resolutions and decades of experience, agreement on a precise
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definition of terrorism remains elusive.81 This paper will exclude instances of terrorist-like
activities at the hands of state organs or agents (as defined by ILC articles 4 and 8) as these do
not raise interesting questions about the public/private dichotomy. 82 The focus instead will be on
what is being said about state responsibility for terrorism when the actors are quite evidently not
organs or agents within the definitions of the ILC Articles.

The United Nations Security Council

Since 2001, the Council has made a number of resolutions pertaining to terrorism and
introduced new duties upon states to take measures to prevent terrorism. 83 The Council has done
so, however, while maintaining an ambiguous stance as to the form of state responsibility for
non-state cross-border terrorist activities. 84 On September 12, 2001, this ambiguity was almost
certainly intentional, as it was not yet known who was behind the previous day’s attacks, and
further investigation may have uncovered direct links to a state or several states. In Resolution
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1368, the Council condemns the attacks on the United States and regards them “like any act of
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.” 85
States have long been required to abstain from supporting non-state terrorists.
Traditionally, if a state’s links to terrorists are not adequate to establish the terrorists as organs or
agents of the state (i.e. they are short of complete dependence or effective control), the attacks
will not be attributable to the state and the state will not have committed an “armed attack.”86
However, support or encouragement of such action will, at the very least, constitute an unlawful
infringement of the sovereignty of the victim state and at most “indirect aggression.” 87 But the
Council in Resolution 1368 suggests the possibility of more direct accountability, stressing that:
“those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors
of these acts will be held accountable.”88 It is not clear for what exactly harboring states will be
held accountable, whether directly for the terrorist attacks themselves or instead only for the
states’ actions (or omissions) in “aiding, supporting or harboring.” In addition, the word “those”
is sufficiently vague to refer either to states or to non-state actors, intended to be held
accountable by states in domestic criminal process. The French text provides no additional
insight.89
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In the shadow of the preparation for the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and
its allies, a little over two weeks later the Council passed Resolution 1373.90 In the preamble, the
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” is again recognized, but there is neither
direct reference to, nor explicit approval of, the invasion. 91 Afghanistan is not named as
responsible for the preceding attacks.92 There are at least two possible explanations for the two
resolutions’ silence on the matter, and both may contain some truth. The meeting lasted only
long enough for the resolution to be passed with all discussions having clearly taken place
beforehand; therefore the reasoning behind the members’ agreement must remain the subject of
speculation.93 Some Council members may have been wary of an explicit authorization of the
invasion because it may, in their view, have necessitated recognition of Afghan responsibility of
the attacks. This view would have extended state responsibility well beyond the classical
limitations of responsibility only for organs and agents. On the other hand, the coalition partners
on the Council may have wished to leave the door open to armed self-defense against other states
where they believed terrorists were enjoying shelter without the need for further Council
negotiation and agreement.94
The main focus of Resolution 1373 has nothing to do with the right of self-defense, but
introduces requirements on all member states of the United Nations to take extensive measures to
prevent terrorism, in particular, to limit terrorist financing. 95 The Council’s authority to pass such
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“legislative” measures has been the subject of some debate.96 However, that need will not
prevent us from considering the Council’s implicit view of state responsibility for terrorist
activities.
States are first instructed to take measures to prevent terrorist funding. 97 Likewise, “[a]ll
states shall” desist from supporting terrorists, suppress terrorist recruitment and transfers of
arms. 98 They should share information with other states that might be targeted for attack and
deny refuge to terrorists and those involved in terrorism. 99 States shall prevent terrorist
operations in their territories, have and apply criminal law against terrorists and share
intelligence information to enable this, and limit the mobility of terrorists.100 States are “called
upon” (a non-binding form of words ) to share information and cooperate in criminal justice,
prevent abuse of their asylum and refugee systems by terrorists, and consider ratification of
counter-terrorism conventions, in particular, the Terrorism Financing Convention.101 The
Council then “[n]otes with concern” links between terrorism and other international crimes, such
as trafficking and money laundering and asks that states cooperate to reduce these activities. 102
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Similar concerns were the subject of Resolution 1269 in 1999.103 Therefore Resolution
1373 might be considered a logical extension of the former resolution. 104 However, the earlier
resolution is a non-binding Chapter VI resolution which only “calls upon” states to action.105
Resolution 1373 instead purports to bind states and creates more specific obligations. 106
The obligations introduced by Resolution 1373 are obligations of conduct, not obligations
of result. 107 States are required to take a number of steps, some rather specific under the shadow
of a thinly veiled threat of forcible measures should they fail to comply. 108 However, according
to this resolution, the activities of non-state terrorists in their territories are not to be
automatically attributed to the host state. Liability is for failure to comply with the resolution, not
for any resulting terrorist activities or terrorist financing. Therefore, if a state fully complies with
the resolution, that state will engage no liability, even if a cross-border terrorist attack takes
place, as the state will not have committed any “wrongful act.” Similarly, a state will be in
breach of the resolution if it fails to take these measures, even if there are no direct consequences
for another state. The question of responsibility for compliance or non-compliance with the
resolution is quite distinct from the actions of terrorists.109
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In 2004, the Council passed Resolution 1540 which obliged states to take certain
measures to prevent the development or proliferation of biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons.110 Unlike Resolution 1373, to which only Cuba openly objected, the Council’s
authority to pass such broad measures came under greater constitutional scrutiny. 111
Resolution 1566 provides an interesting account of the Council’s view of states’
contemporary obligations to prevent terrorism. In it, the Council:
calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, especially with those
States where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with
their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to
justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports,
facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation
or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens.112
As indicated above, there is no direct and unambiguous view of state responsibility for
terrorism made explicit in these resolutions. The need for unanimity, at least between the
permanent members and politically desirable amongst all fifteen, has precluded such
elucidation. 113
The duty to desist from terrorism, even indirectly such as through financing or arming
terrorists, is a central part of the customary and Charter law that states must not interfere with
one another’s sovereignty.114 This negative obligation to refrain from action remains unchanged.
State responsibility will depend upon the identification of a state organ or agent who has
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provided support. However, the state will be responsible to the extent of its support, not for the
resulting acts of terrorism.
States also have a positive duty to take measures to prevent terrorism, a duty of due
diligence that is at least as old as the United Nations and defined by the Court in Corfu Channel,
as one of: “certain general and well defined principled, namely… every State’s obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”115 Should
States fail to take adequate measures, Ago explains:
the Government of that State will be accused of having failed to fulfil its international
obligations with respect to vigilance, protection and control, or having failed in its
specific duty not to tolerate the preparation on its territory of actions which are directed
against a foreign Government or might endanger the latter’s security and so on.116
An interpretation of the Security Council’s resolutions within the classical view of state
responsibility would indicate that the degree of diligence due to prevent terrorism has been
considerably expanded, particularly by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. This indicates a change in
the primary rules without posing a challenge to the traditional view of state responsibility per se.
As such, it is comparable to Cook’s approach of expanding positive obligations of states to
protect individuals, particularly women, from “private” violations of human rights.117 Should the
state fail to meet the standards required by the resolutions, the state will be responsible, not for
the terrorist attacks (or private human rights violations) but for the separate delict of its failure to
protect. “[T]hese alleged cases of State responsibility for the acts of individuals are really cases
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of responsibility of the State for omissions by its organs: the State is responsible for having failed
to take appropriate measures to prevent or punish the individual’s act.”118
It is possible, however, that Resolution 1368 be interpreted as indicating a direct
accountability for terrorist acts that a state has failed to prevent even in the absence of the organ
or agency tests being met. Such an interpretation would indicate a more radical dispensation with
the public/private dichotomy, in line with Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s approach to private
violations of women’s rights.119 This approach would be plausible if one takes the view that the
right of self-defense exists only against an “armed attack” (itself uncontroversial) and that only
states can commit armed attacks (more controversial).120 However, the uncertainty as to the
identity of the perpetrators of the attacks when this resolution was passed makes this
interpretation a less convincing one.

Counter-Terrorism Scholarship

Scholars have likewise questioned the public/private dichotomy in light of state
responsibility for terrorism. 121 Travalio and Altenburg make the case that state responsibility for
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terrorism exists when there are links meeting a much lower threshold than that held in Nicaragua
or the Iran Hostages cases.122 They argue, essentially, that contemporary international terrorism
creates unique threats, and as a matter of necessity, this justifies a lex specialis in the secondary
rules of state responsibility in order to allow for state self-protection.123 They cite Oscar
Schachter (famously “alienated” by the Australian feminists’ attack on the public/private
dichotomy124) in support of blurred boundaries with reference to terrorism: “When a Government
provides weapons, technical advice, transportation, aid and encouragement to terrorists on a
substantial scale it is not unreasonable to conclude that the armed attack is imputable to that
government.”125
Travalio and Altenburg argue not only that the law of state responsibility ought to evolve
to allow states to protect themselves against major terrorist threats, but also that it has already so
evolved, citing in support the opinio iuris of the United States considered above and, more
importantly, the absence of express objections to that state’s position by other members of the
international community. 126 They argue that this new doctrine of state responsibility for
terrorism, requiring as it does a much lower threshold of “support” in order for the state to be
held accountable, has been tacitly accepted and is now customary international law. 127 They
conclude:
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the standard for state responsibility is one of sanctuary or support, and it has been
accepted by the world community. The pronouncements of the United Nations over the
past three decades that states have a responsibility under international law to refrain
from supporting or harboring terrorists have been transformed into a principle of state
accountability for the acts of terrorists. Once a state makes it clear that it is uninterested
in eliminating a terrorist threat emanating from its soil, it has assumed responsibility for
the actions of the terrorists, and has opened itself to the lawful use of force by the
threatened state.128
Vincent-Joël Proulx claims that post 9/11, the Nicaragua and

tests for state

responsibility have been abandoned, at least with respect to terrorism. 129 Although he agrees that
the United States’ administration has collapsed the distinction between direct and indirect
responsibility — between responsibility for actions and omissions — he does not agree with
Travalio and Altenburg that this is the contemporary state of international law. 130 Instead,
according to Proulx, the better view is one in line with that of Rebecca Cook, where there
remains a distinction between direct responsibility (for organs and agents who fail to respect
international law) and indirect responsibility (for the failure of due diligence to prevent non-state
violations of international law). 131 However, indirect responsibility is now taken much more
seriously, just as Cook would like to see with regard to women’s human rights.132 The
international responses to the attacks of 9/11 have led to a: “monumental shift in international
law from direct to indirect state responsibility. Indirect responsibility is no longer a second-best
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when direct responsibility cannot be established; rather, it has supplanted direct responsibility as
the dominant theme in the field of attribution.” 133 He claims that indirect responsibility is just as
serious as direct responsibility when terrorist attacks occur: “[A] state’s passiveness or
indifference toward terrorist agendas within its own territory might trigger its responsibility,
possibly on the same scale as though it had actively participated in the planning.” 134
However, Proulx remains dissatisfied with indirect responsibility for terrorism and an
expansion of positive obligations, given the fundamental objectives of “saving lives and
protecting citizens.”135 Instead, he prescriptively argues that the rules of attribution should be
circumvented altogether in favor of a form of “strict liability” for terrorism. 136 He mitigates this
slightly by introducing a possible defense for states whose territory is used by terrorists to
prepare attacks, allowing them to exclude their liability should they successfully demonstrate
that they have exercised due diligence to prevent the attacks.137 His answer then is not so much
strict liability, but rather a rebuttable presumption of responsibility followed by a shift in the
burden of proof.
Tal Becker provides the deepest and most nuanced analysis of state responsibility for
terrorism in his 2006 book Terrorism and the State.138 Like the feminists before him, he
recognizes that the distinction between positive and negative responsibility, between
acquiescence and the failure of due diligence, is not easy to maintain in practice. 139 Becker’s
view is that neither a simple strict liability approach, nor a weak approach that allows states to
excuse their inaction by claiming good faith are adequate models to respond to the contemporary
133
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terrorist threat.140 He explains the positive responsibilities on states to prevent terrorism as
underlined by due diligence at two levels. States must first “pursue and acquire” territorial
control and adequate administrative apparatuses; secondly, they must employ those
capabilities.141 States would accordingly engage liability for a “separate delict” should they fail
on either of these counts.142
Unpersuaded by the adequacy of this due diligence model, Becker argues for a looser
regime for attribution of responsibility. He suggests that states which have suitable counterterrorism organs in place, but operate them only formally and without vigor should be held
directly accountable for any resulting terrorist attacks. In Becker’s view, their failure is
tantamount to acquiescence and as such, is a violation of the negative duty to abstain from
terrorist activities.143 States who have instead not acquiesced, but nevertheless fail to exercise
due diligence remain responsible by virtue of failing to meet their positive obligations to prevent
(a separate delict).144 Finally, a state of limited capacity that does its utmost but still fails to
prevent a terrorist attack will not be in violation of the due diligence standard and will not bear
any responsibility. 145 Becker’s model shifts the focus from the need to establish an organ or
agency relationship between state and perpetrator to a focus on the wrongful act with causation
as the basis of responsibility. 146 Becker’s argument is prescriptive, but he also defends it as
potentially descriptive, with an examination of recent state practice in response to terrorist
attacks.147 His position is that this causation theory of state responsibility may be lex specialis
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pertaining to terrorism, or alternatively, a general basis of state responsibility for private acts in
international law.148 The latter argument would, of course, have major implications in
international human rights law, in particular with regard to private violations of women’s rights.
The state would bear direct responsibility for private wrongs, instead of only indirect
responsibility pivoting on the due diligence standard.
Becker makes a number of statements that are reminiscent of the radical feminist
writings:
The agency paradigm not only neglects the subtle relationships between the private and
public sphere in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, it encourages [acts of terrorism]. 149
Persistent State failure to prevent wrongs within the private domain can be as much a
form of State policy as direct governmental action. But by conceiving of responsibility
through the prism of the public/private distinction this method of State action can be
concealed. The result is to shield the functioning State from direct responsibility when its
wrongful conduct was a direct cause of the private harm. 150
Because the State is subject to a detailed duty to prevent terrorism, its failure to regulate
terrorist conduct in the private domain, when it has the capacity to do so, can be a form
of State participation in the private wrong. This is not because the State necessarily
controls the private conduct as principal in an agency relationship or because it is
complicitous in the criminal sense, but rather because it is the State’s unlawful failures
that have made possible the very private terrorist activity that it is charged to forestall.
In an international system in which only the State enjoys widespread monopoly on
the legitimate use of force, it cannot be indifferent to the illicit use of force by private
148
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actors which it is obligated to prevent and then claim that its responsibility is limited to
the conduct of its own agents. The very monopoly over force in international affairs
makes the State, at least potentially, a direct participant in the private violence that is
acts or omissions wrongfully allow.151
To Becker’s credit, he is the only one of the scholars discussed here who recognizes the
links with earlier feminist approaches. However, despite quoting Chinkin and Romany, he does
not explore these links in any depth or examine any of the responses by “mainstream”
international lawyers to the feminist approach as they might be applied to his own argument.152
Derek Jinks considers changes in state practice and opinio iuris following 9/11 and
concludes that these may indicate a change in the secondary rules of state responsibility,
suggesting that “the emergent rule arguably reconfigures the distinction between public and
private conduct.”153 He cautions against acceptance of such a change, instead arguing that
terrorism is best countered by increasing states’ obligations through stronger primary rules,
requiring states to take greater measures to prevent terrorism. 154 As such, his position is
consistent with the pragmatic approach of Rebecca Cook in improving women’s enjoyment of
human rights.155
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Opinio Iuris of the United States

The United States’ administration in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 shared the “radical
feminist” position, evidenced by the famous statement of the president on September 11 that
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who
harbor them.”156 The president expanded upon this later the same month, stating:
By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder . . . Every
nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” 157
In November 2001, he continued: “If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm
a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you
will be held accountable by the United States and our friends.” 158
The president’s position was echoed on the floor of the Security Council, with the
American representative similarly stating: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them. We will bring those responsible to
account.”159
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State Practice: Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

Within a few weeks of 9/11, the United States and a coalition of allies had begun an
aerial campaign against Afghanistan and later sent in ground troops in order to root out the
terrorists behind the attacks of 9/11.160 The Taliban, as the self-declared and de facto but largely
unrecognized government of Afghanistan, had been given the option of avoiding invasion by
surrendering Bin Laden and other purported terrorists; releasing all detained foreign nationals;
protecting journalists, diplomats and aid workers; closing all terrorist training camps; and giving
unrestricted access to the terrorist training camps to allow verification that they were all beyond
use.161 To no-one’s surprise, the Taliban rejected these demands, instead responding that they
would try Bin Laden in Afghanistan and asking the United States to provide evidence of his
involvement in the attacks.162 This counter-offer was likewise rejected.163 Military action
commenced shortly afterwards, aimed, according to the United States, “at the Taleban [sic.]
rather than the Afghan people.”164 Days after the commencement of aerial bombing, the Taliban
offered to surrender Bin Laden to a neutral third country for trial. This offer was similarly
unsatisfactory to the United States.165
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In line with Article 51 of the Charter, the actions taken in “self-defense” against
Afghanistan were duly notified to the Security Council. After briefly describing the attacks, the
United States informed the Security Council of its possession of “clear and compelling
information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks” and that the attacks and the ongoing threat “posed
by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of
operation.”166 The military self-defense operations were aimed at “Al-Qaeda terrorist training
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”167
The letter from the United Kingdom similarly referred to “information” indicating AlQaeda’s responsibility for the attacks and claimed their military operations were “directed
against Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is
supporting it.”168 The following day, the United Kingdom presented a further letter outlining the
basis of the claim that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were behind the 9/11 attacks. That letter
concluded: “[t]he attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taleban [sic.]
and Osama Bin Laden, which allowed Bin Laden to operate freely in Afghanistan, promoting,
planning and executing terrorist activity.” 169 The theme of an “alliance” or even a “close
alliance” between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is the main predicate for the justification of military
action against the Taliban’s own institutions. 170 However, even accepting the United Kingdom’s
conclusions as presented to the Security Council in the absence of the supporting evidence —
166
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which was withheld from the Security Council owing to the “need to protect intelligence
sources”171 — the United Kingdom did not argue that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are synonymous
or that the organs of the Taliban coordinated the 9/11 attacks and pose an ongoing threat. At best,
the United Kingdom attempted to portray a relationship in line with much of the “overall
control” test of the

case,172 but to the extent that the relationship is portrayed as one of

mutual support and shared objectives, it is likewise one of mutual independence. One cannot
readily characterize it as one of “control”; neither does the Taliban exercise any control over AlQaeda, nor Al-Qaeda over organs of the Taliban.
It is important to recall here the widely held pre 9/11 view on the legality of self-defense
under Article 51:
[a]ny state that seeks to invoke the right of self-defense should be required to furnish the
international community with credible evidence that it has suffered an attack, that the
entity against which the right of self-defense is exercised was the source of that attack,
that the attack or threat of attack is continuing, and that the use of force is necessary to
protect the state from further injury.173
Ignoring Charney’s concerns that sufficient evidence was not in fact presented to the
Security Council to prove Al-Qaeda’s responsibility, two more pressing questions remain. 174 The
first is whether the definition of armed attack — and thus legitimacy of measures taken in selfdefense — still pivots on the Definition of Aggression from the Nicaragua case, namely,
“sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to acts of
171
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aggression.”175 The text “armed attack” of Article 51 is inconclusive; however, state practice and
opinio iuris suggest that attribution of responsibility to a state was a prerequisite for legal
intervention in the territory of a sovereign host state, at least prior to 9/11.176 The second
question is whether the military actions were lawful against the Taliban rather than against AlQaeda itself. None of the states involved in the coalition in Afghanistan ever suggested that the
Taliban was directly behind the attacks; rather its “support” for Al-Qaeda was enough to justify
military action against its own institutions. 177 Becker explains: “Operation Enduring Freedom
was explicitly justified on the contentious claim that the act of harboring terrorists is legally
indistinguishable from the actual perpetration of the terrorist acts.”178
The incursions into Afghanistan were not aimed solely at the terrorists as authors of the
attacks, but equally at the de facto government, the Taliban. 179 The United States and its allies
intentionally overthrew that regime. Links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda go beyond the
merely territorial, but nonetheless are a far cry from the threshold of complete dependence or
effective control applied in the Nicaragua Judgment and recently reiterated in the Genocide
Convention Case.180 They do not even come close to the criteria of “overall control” of the
decision, a test that has now been discredited by the International Court of Justice. 181
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The military action, and the wide international support for the same, against the Taliban,
as opposed to merely Al-Qaeda members and locations, can be interpreted as an example of state
practice which equates non-state and state conduct for the purposes of responsibility. 182 By
holding the Taliban responsible for the actions of terrorists that it merely hosts on its soil (albeit
willingly), the boundaries between public and private conduct in international law take on a
fundamentally new shade. 183 If this example of state practice and the wide opinio iuris in its
support is to be considered as sufficient to constitute a new rule of customary international law,
then the more radical feminists have won a battle, albeit in a manner they might themselves find
difficult to support.184 In short, this new rule holds that states are responsible, directly
responsible, for permitting private violations of international law to occur. Governments in such
circumstances should anticipate the possibility of immediate repercussions against their own
institutions, not just against the private actors who directly caused the harm.
It takes Eric Posner, in a book review addressed to a political science audience, to point
to the elephant in the room.
The organizing premise [of Becker’s thesis, arguing that the Afghanistan war constitutes
a new rule of international law] is that all states are treated the same by international
law; the goal is to derive a universal norm from a handful of legal and historical
precedents. Thus, Becker largely ignores the most likely scenario: that nations that
approved of or acquiesced in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did so for geopolitical
reasons and did not believe that they thereby committed themselves to a general legal
182
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norm that permits any nation attacked by foreign terrorists – India, Israel, Russia, Iraq –
to invade a country that harbored them, as the causation-based theory requires. It may be
that one set of rules governs the United States and another set of rules governs other
nations.185
It may be too much to suppose that the law in this area is principled and coherent and that
“all states are treated the same.”186 The United States was under enormous domestic pressure to
make a show of force in response to an unprecedented attack on its home soil against
predominantly United States civilians. In their rush to express outrage at the attacks and support
for the global hegemon, much of the opinio iuris in support of the military action may have been
too little considered. On the other hand, it seems inconceivable that states and their
representatives were oblivious to the significance of their words and actions. World leaders may
not be scholars of international law — they may not even be particularly interested in
international law — but they are backed by teams of advisors who are.
However, one should not rely too heavily on the single example of the response in
Afghanistan to the perceived Al-Qaeda threat. Customary international law contains space for
exceptions and this may be one such exception, especially considering the unique circumstances
under which it was undertaken.187 It will take a great deal more state practice and opinio iuris to
answer the age old question of customary international law: when do the exceptions become the
norm?188
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Later military action in the “War on Terror” does not cast any new light on the question
of state responsibility. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is of less significance in identifying the
boundaries between public and private responsibility. At least prior to 2003, the perceived threat
emanating from Iraq to Western democracies was from clearly identifiable public (state) actors,
most obviously the president and members of his extended family exercising elements of
governmental and administrative authority. 189

PART FOUR: UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, DANGEROUS BEDFELLOWS

The Public/Private Divide Lives On

Despite much official hand-wringing over the plight of Afghan women in the fall of
2001, feminists would be wise to retain doubts that international law has radically changed or is
ready to bring women’s daily challenges to the forefront of its attention.190 The traditional
narrow vision of the state was firmly upheld in the Genocide Convention case by the
International Court of Justice, international law’s ultimate arbiter.191 Should it face a terrorism
case, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Court would back an expanded notion of
responsibility, attributing to the state terrorist activities by ostensibly private actors. They may
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consider terrorism as lex specialis; or, more likely, they would continue to rely instead on the
Nicaragua test as they did in the Genocide Convention case.192
It is unlikely that The Boundaries of International Law occupies space on the personal
bookshelves of President George W. Bush, or that its contents informed his speechwriters. 193
Those most forcefully advocating an expansion of state responsibility for terrorism are not doing
so with the feminist arguments in mind.194 Although keen to enlarge the range of state
responsibility for terrorism and thus undermine the traditional public/private divide of
international law, there remains a simultaneous insistence, even dependence, on the
public/private divide by the states most deeply engaged in counter-terrorist operations and
conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. A few select examples can demonstrate this.

“Enemy Combatants”

The state which harbors terrorists might be responsible for any international attacks that
those terrorists carry out; but the terrorists themselves are not, according to the United States, to
be considered agents or organs of the state in the Nicaragua or ILC Articles sense. 195 The
position of the United States is that they are to be considered, once detained, as “enemy
combatants,” neither prisoners of war nor civilians entitled to the protections of Geneva
Conventions III and IV respectively. 196 This asymmetry operates to the benefit of the United
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States and its allies by legitimizing their military action as lawful under the Charter without
requiring those same states to extend the usual protections to those detained in its course.197

Private Contractors in Combat and Quasi-Combat Operations

Extensive use of private contractors in the “War on Terror” in both Afghanistan and Iraq
further reifies the public/private dichotomy to the extent that the states paying the contractors’
salaries will seek to exclude themselves from liability when those contractors violate either
international law or domestic law in the state of their operations.198 It is very much in the
interests of the states hiring the contractors to continue to insist upon a test of state responsibility
pivoting on Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the ILC Articles, namely, the Nicaragua tests of complete
dependence or effective control (Article 4 and 8) or the test of “exercising elements of
governmental authority” (Article 5) to ensure that any wayward actions of the contractors will
not be attributable to the those states.199 Further, the jurisdiction of the Iraqi domestic legal
process has been curtailed against the same private contractors by virtue of an executive order of
the occupying forces. 200 Thus internationally unlawful actions of contractors fall into a legal
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black hole; there can be no domestic legal process against the individuals or their firms, nor
international legal process against the states which gives them license. 201

Private Contractors in Reconstruction and Privatization of Services

As military operations take out bridges, roads, electricity, and safe water supplies, private
contractors, predominantly United States’ companies, are engaged to restore them.202
Furthermore, the development and maintenance of market-based economies (involving transfer
of service sectors and infrastructure from public to private control) is itself lauded as a central
pillar of counter-terrorism strategies as well as a necessary feature of development.203
This is unlikely to be good news for the poorest women of Iraq or Afghanistan or to those
engaged primarily in unpaid and unrecognized labor. Privatization of vital social services is
translated amongst poor populations as the transfer of responsibility from the state to women’s
backs, from paid labor to invisible unpaid family labor, “a transfer of costs from the market to
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http://trade.gov/iraq/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
203
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, (United States of America, Washington D.C., Feb. 2003) 2223; George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html; George W. Bush, President of the United
States
of
America,
State
of
the
Union
Address
(Jan.
20,
2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
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the household.”204 Privatization of education and health-care means less of both for the poorest
women and girls.
Shortly before the seismic events of 9/11, Charlesworth and Chinkin wrote: “The two
major challenges to all human rights, and especially to those of women, in the twenty-first
century will be the forces of religious extremism and of economic globalization.”205
Development in Afghanistan and redevelopment in Iraq following the usual contemporary model
will serve to reinforce the comparative disadvantages of women and permit, even require, further
exploitation of women’s unpaid labor.206

The (Private) Place of Women

Hand in hand with the liberalization of the market in the post-intervention economies
comes the further reification of the public/private dichotomies long criticized by feminists in
Western democracies, as women (and violence against them) are considered non-political.
Women are effectively excluded from positions of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
similarly have been largely excluded in negotiations between competing factions. 207 The (male)

204

LOURDES BENERÍA, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: ECONOMICS AS IF ALL PEOPLE MATTERED,
49-50 (Routledge 2003).
205
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, , supra note 48, at 249.
206
See, e.g., Diane Otto, Holding up Half the Sky: But for Whose Benefit? A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World
Conference on Women 6 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 7 (1996); BENERÍA, supra note 204, at 47-53; Ambreena Manji,
Remortgaging Women’s Lives: The World Bank’s Land Agenda in Africa, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 139 (2003)
especially at 147-157; Ambreena Manji, “They Beautyful Ones” of Law and Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 159, especially at 165-168; Fiona Beveridge, Feminist
Perspectives in International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, id. at 173,
especially at 178-81 & 189.
207
Chinkin, et al., supra note 190, at 19; Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 184, at 602. Of the twenty ministries
in the transitional Afghan Government (2002-2004), only 2 portfolios were held by women; human rights, and
health. The President, five vice-presidents and five national defense commissioners were all men: Transitional
Government of Afghanistan, AFGHANLAND.COM, http://www.afghanland.com/history/transitional.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2008). The current cabinet of 26 has only one, Hosn Bano Ghazanfar, with the unsurprising portfolio of
women’s affairs: The Cabinet, (Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan),
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self-declared leaders are presumed to speak for all and women’s rights become a matter of
relative cultural values. 208 This is self-determination of a highly selective “self.” Violence against
women qua women is considered a matter of domestic law, and when domestic process fails to
take it seriously, no questions are raised by the state’s allies about the legitimacy of the
government or its sovereign inviolability. 209 Despite changes in the language of state
responsibility, little has changed for women since the “liberation” of Kuwait from the oppressive
Iraqi invader in 1991, after which Kuwaiti women remained disenfranchised from the electoral
process and foreign women found themselves targets of sexual violence by Kuwaiti men, often
ostensibly under color of state authority.210

Masculinity and the “War on Terror”

Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state
to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and
women as victims. 211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate
aftermath in which women featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack,
http://www.president.gov.af/english/cabinet.mspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2008). The interim Iraqi Government (20032005) of 37 included 6 women, all in junior roles: Sharon Otterman, Iraq: The Interim Government Leaders,
(Council of Foreign Relations, June 2, 2004), http://www.cfr.org/publication/7664/#1. The post 2006 election Iraqi
Government has portfolios for 4 women, namely environment, housing, health and women’s affairs Member’s of
Iraq’s Government, (Education for Peace in Iraq Center, May 1, 2007), http://ww2.epicusa.org/files/EPIC/IRAQ_Government.pdf.
208
When pressed on the question of women’s rights, the U.S. response was “Right now we have other priorities,”
see FALUDI, supra note 190, at 41.
209
Afghanistan: “One Month in Afghanistan: A Step Backwards for Women in Afghanistan,” (Women Under
Muslim Laws, June 20. 2007), http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-554302;
IRAQ: WOMEN’S RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK: OCCUPATION, CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTALISMS, (Women Under
Muslim Laws, Occasional Paper, No. 15, 2006).
210
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 262.
211
Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 184; Shelley Wright, The Horizon of Becoming: Culture, Gender and
History after September 11, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 215, 245 (2002), comparing the collapse of the twin towers to a
castration, feeding a need for the American state to reclaim its virility. See also, CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra
note 48, at 137-39; see also FALUDI, supra note 190, at 46-64 & 89-115.
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preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the
twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams
were conspicuous by their invisibility. 213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a
brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214
The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship
encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” —
a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the
media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early
impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s
empowerment and equal participation in the public sphere is unlikely to find favor.217

Final Words

Ultimately, being conceived female constitutes a much greater threat to one’s survival
and level of well-being than the threat of terrorist attacks.218 On reflection, the counter-terrorism
strategies and rhetoric considered more broadly indicate that this stark fact is likely to remain so
for some time to come.
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Organization, Geneva, 2008), http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/women/en/index.html (last visited April 23,
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